Data outsourcing allows data owners to keep their data at untrusted clouds that do not ensure the privacy of data and/or computations. One useful framework for fault-tolerant data processing in a distributed fashion is MapReduce, which was developed for trusted private clouds. This paper presents algorithms for data outsourcing based on Shamir's secret-sharing scheme and for executing privacy-preserving SQL queries such as count, selection including range selection, projection, and join while using MapReduce as an underlying programming model. The proposed algorithms prevent the untrusted cloud to know the database or the query while also preventing output size and access-pattern attacks. Interestingly, our algorithms do not need the database owner, which only creates and distributes secret-shares once, to be involved to answer any query, and hence, the database owner also cannot learn the query. We evaluate the efficiency of the algorithms on parameters: (i) the number of communication rounds (between a user and a cloud), (ii) the total amount of bit flow (between a user and a cloud), and (iii) the computational load at the user-side and the cloud-side.
INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed a huge amount of sensitive data generation due to several applications, e.g., location tracking sensors, web crawling, social networks, and body-area networks. Such a real-time data provides an ease to the user in several ways such as suggesting new restaurants, music, videos, alarms for health checkups based on the user history; hence, carries a potential threat to the user privacy. MapReduce [1] , was introduced by Google in 2004, emerged as a programming model for fast, parallel, and fault-tolerant processing of a large-scale data at a trusted private cloud. The huge amount of data creates hurdles to process it at a private cloud due to limited available resources. Therefore, data and computation outsourcing, which move databases and computations from a trusted private cloud to an untrusted centralized (public) cloud, become a prominent solution. However, the outsourcing comes with a risk to security and privacy of data and computations. In present, due to constraints such as limited network bandwidth and network latency, data uploading to far sided clouds is not a trivial task, and edge or fog computing overcomes such a problem to some extents [2] , [3] . However, the edge or fog computing also suffers from the same security/privacy issues in data processing.
Recently, some works based on encryption [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] and trusted hardware [9] , [10] are proposed for executing a MapReduce computation in a secure and privacy-preserving manner at the cloud. Encryption-based secure MapReduce techniques [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] provide computationally secure frameworks while they are limited to only count and selection queries on a non-skewed data. All such techniques also inherit disadvantages of encryption techniques. For example, MrCrypt [7] , which is based on homomorphic encryption, prevents information leakage but incurs a significant time delay [11] , [12] . Prism [5] , which is based on searchable encryption, also leaks the keywords and index traversal. Trusted-hardware based solutions, e.g., M2R [10] , VC3 [9] , which are based on Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [13] , try to achieve a higher level of security by hiding access-patterns. However, as stated in [11] , these solutions suffer from information leakage during intermediate data traversal from mappers to reducers. Moreover, a limited size of SGX prevents an efficient execution of the complex computations, e.g., join. Thus, the existing solutions suffer from either in providing completely secure computations, a wide range of SQL queries, or both.
The following example shows that the hiding access-patterns is not enough to achieve the complete security, even if the query is hidden and the data is non-deterministically 1 encrypted. Consider an employee relation denoted by E(SSN , Name) and a cancer hospital relation denoted by H(SSN , Name, Treatment). Also, consider that both the relations are stored at a single cloud 2 that may be an honest-but-curious adversary, which executes the query correctly but tries to learn more about encrypted data. Assume a query that finds the employees' details suffering from cancer, i.e., SELECT E.SSN, E.Name FROM E INNER JOIN H ON E.SSN=H.SSN. Before executing this query, an adversary is not aware of the 1. Non-deterministic encryption achieves cipher-text indistinguishably, so that the adversary cannot know which two cipher-texts contain an identical plain-text, by just observing the encrypted data.
2. Hereafter we use the word "cloud" to indicate public or edge clouds, since our proposed algorithms are not dependent on the type of the computing resources. arXiv:1801.10323v1 [cs.DB] 31 Jan 2018 number of employees suffering from cancer. However, after executing such a query, the adversary can know the number of employees suffering from cancer based on output sizes. This is more information what the adversary had before the query. Therefore, a completely secure solution must achieve (i) data privacy (i.e., the data or metadata should not be revealed to the adversary before/during/after a computation, and the user/querier should not learn more data what he should learn in response to the query) (ii) query privacy (i.e., the user query should be hidden from the database (DB) owner and the cloud).
Contribution
In this paper, our goal is to support privacy-preserving complex SQL queries, e.g., select, project, and join, while guaranteeing information-theoretic data and query privacy. Here, the algorithms are developed for MapReduce; however, they can be generalized for the standard database systems and any other frameworks. Our contribution can be summarized, as follows: Information-theoretically secure outsourcing. We provide an information-theoretically secure data and computation outsourcing technique that prevents an adversary to know the database or the query. We use an encoding mechanism for data and computation outsourcing using Shamir's secret-sharing (SSS) [14] that prevents an adversary to learn anything about the data or the query, unless the number of clouds over a threshold colludes. The proposed secret-shared-based encoding mechanism creates different shares (of multiple occurrences) of an identical value, preventing the frequency-count attack (i.e., finding the number of tuples containing an identical value). A user executes queries on these secret-shares without revealing the queries and outputs to the clouds or the DB owner. Interestingly, the techniques are designed in such a way that after outsourcing the DB to clouds, the DB owner does not need to be online during any query execution. Privacy-preserving query execution by third-parties. We provide privacy-preserving algorithms for queries, as: count ( §3.1), selection ( §3.2), project ( §3.3.2), join ( §3.3), and range ( §3.4). The queries are executed in an oblivious manner, so that the adversary cannot distinguish any two queries and data satisfying (based on access-patterns) to the queries. Moreover, the proposed approaches does not reveal the output or the query based on output sizes. The proposed approaches are mainly utilizing accumulating-automata (AA) [15] that originally supports only count queries. We extended such an approach to execute various operations. Minimum leakage and complex queries. During a MapReduce computation, an adversary having some background knowledge can learn some information by observing output sizes, as shown in the previous example. The proposed algorithms minimize information leakage and impose some work at the user-side to obtain the final output by performing an interpolation on the partial outputs of the cloud. These algorithms result in a different amount of workload at the user-side. We find a relationship among the workload at the user-side, the number of communication rounds, and the data privacy. We will see in §3.2, in the case of skewed data, as the user is willing to perform fewer interpolation tasks on the partial outputs of the clouds, information leakage at the cloud increases that may breach the data privacy.
The proposed algorithms overcome the disadvantages of the existing encryption-based techniques [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] by allowing oblivious complex queries such as join using MapReduce and secret-sharing-based data outsourcing techniques [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] . Thus, there is no need for (i) sharing information among different DB owners, unlike [16] , (ii) having an identical share for multiple occurrences of a value, unlike [17] , and (iii) a third party can directly execute queries in the clouds without revealing queries to the clouds/DB owner. Analysis of the algorithms. We analyze our algorithms on four parameters, as: the total amount of bits flow between a user and a cloud, the number of interaction rounds between a user and a cloud, and the computational workload on the user-side and the cloud-side. Table 1 shows a comparison of different approaches. From Table 1 , it is clear that our count query algorithm requires an identical amount of communication like encryption-based Epic [6] . However, we perform a little bit more work at the cloud due to our secret-sharing-based data encoding technique. In case of a selection query, where one value has one tuple, we perform better than existing SSS-based selection query algorithm both in terms of communication and computational cost at the cloud. However, when a value has multiple tuples, our algorithms work as good as existing algorithms; nonetheless, we provide more secure ways to prevent information leakage.
Related Work
Shamir's secret-sharing. Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) [14] is a cryptographic algorithm developed by Adi Shamir in 1979. The main idea of SSS is to divide a secret value, say S, into c non-communicating participants/clouds such that no one can know the secret S until collecting c < c shares, where c is the threshold of SSS. In particular, the secret owner randomly selects a polynomial of degree c − 1 with c − 1 random coefficients:
, where a 0 = S and p is a prime number. The secret owner distributes the secret S to the c clouds by placing x = 1, 2, . . . , c in p(x). The secret S is constructed by performing Lagrange interpolation [21] on any c shares.
MapReduce was introduced by Dean and Ghemawat in 2004 [1] . PRISM [4] , PIRMAP [5] , EPiC [6] , MrCrypt [7] , and Crypsis [8] provide privacy-preserving MapReduce computations in the cloud on encrypted data. However, as mentioned previously, all these protocols/systems provide only count and selection queries on encrypted data while either incur a significant overhead in terms of time or do not provide complete security (as a tradeoff between preserving data privacy and utilization). There are some other encryption-based systems [22] , [23] , [24] and trusted hardware-based systems [9] , [10] , [25] , [26] , [27] for executing SQL queries without using MapReduce as a programming model. These systems also result in information leakage due to deterministic or order-preserving encryption [28] , [29] or limited operations. However, we do not study these systems in detail. Details of security and privacy concerns in MapReduce may be found in [30] . The authors [16] provide a privacy-preserving join operation using secret-sharing. The approach [16] requires that two different DB owners share some information for constructing an identical share for identical values in their relations. However, sharing information among DB owners is not trivial when they are governed by different organizations and policies, and moreover, by following this approach, a malicious DB owner may be able to obtain another relation.
The authors [17] provide a technique for data outsourcing using a variation of SSS. However, the approach [17] suffers from two major limitations, as follows: (i) in order to produce an answer to a query, the DB owner has to work on all the shares, hence, the DB owner (not the cloud) performs a lot of work; and (ii) a third-party without involving the DB owner cannot directly issue any query on secret-shares. In [17] , the authors provide a way for constructing polynomials that can maintain the orders of the secrets. However, these kinds of polynomials are based on an integer ring (no modular reduction) rather than a finite field; thus, it has a potential security risk. There are some other works [18] , [19] , [20] that provide searching operations on secret-shares. In [18] , a data owner builds a Merkle hash tree [31] according to a query. In [19] , a user knows the addresses of the desired tuples, so they can fetch all those tuples obliviously from the clouds without performing a search operation in the cloud. Similar ideas can also be found in [20] .
To the best of our knowledge, there is no algorithm that (i) eliminates the need of a DB owner in answering queries, except one-time creation and distribution of secret-shares, (ii) minimizes the overhead at the user-side, and (ii) provides information-theoretically secure MapReduce computations (count, selection including range selection, projection, and join) in the cloud.
THE MODEL
We assume three entities in our model, which is given in Figure 1 , as follows: (i) The trusted database (DB) owner, who creates secret-shares of her data and outsources the secret-shares. An algorithm for creating secret-shares is presented in §2.1.
(ii) A set of c untrusted and non-communicating clouds, 3 which store the database of the form of secret-shares and execute user computations. Since we are using MapReduce as our programming model, the clouds deploy a master process that executes the computation by allocating the map tasks and the reduce tasks.
(iii) An (authenticated and authorized) user, who executes queries on the secret-shared data at the clouds. The query 3 . The meaning of non-communicating clouds is that they do not exchange data with each other, only exchange data with the user or the database owner. We use c clouds to provide privacy-preserving computations using SSS. Note that a single non-trustworthy cloud cannot provide privacy-preserving computations using secret-sharing. must be sent to at least c < c number of clouds, where c is the threshold of SSS. The user interacts only with the master process in the cloud, and the master process provides the addresses of the partial outputs to the user. The user fetches the partial outputs from the clouds and performs a simple operation (especially, polynomial interpolation using Lagrange polynomials [21] ) for obtaining the secret-value. (It must be noted that the communication between the user and the clouds is presumed to be the same as the communication between the user and the master process.) Table 2 shows notations used in this paper. 
The node j of the accumulating-automata is executing a step in the i th iteration Note. Physical machines of a single cloud provider can be compromised as well, possibly leaking information (through the network) they received when participating in MapReduce; thus, secret sharing will make the leaked information meaningless, as long as the number of leaked machines is less than the threshold or the compromised machines are controlled by different (non-collaborating) adversaries.
Data Model: Creation and Distribution of Secret-Shares of a Relation
In the model, a DB owner first creates secret-shares of her data before outsourcing it to c non-communicating clouds. Let R be a relation of n tuples having m attributes:
. . , A m . Let t ij be a value at the i th tuple and j th attribute. The DB owner creates c shares of each value t ij , resulting in c relations:
. . , A m ). The notation R s i denotes a relation i of the form of secret-shares. The relations R s 1 , R s 2 , . . . , R s c are outsourced to clouds, one relation at each cloud. We explain the creation of secret-shares with the help of an example of a relation, Employee; see Figure 2 . We first provide a simplified and insecure algorithm, and then, a secure algorithm [15] for creating secret-shares based on SSS.
A simple and insecure way for creating encoded data (non-secret-shares). Assume that a database contains only English words. Since the English alphabet consists of 26 letters, each letter can be represented by a unary vector with 26 bits. Hence, the letter 'A' is represented as (1 1 , 0 2 , 0 3 , . . . , 0 26 ), where the subscript represents the position of the letter; since 'A' is the first letter, the first value in the vector is one and others are zero. Similarly, 'B' is (0 1 , 1 2 , 0 3 , . . . , 0 26 ), 'J' is (0 1 , . . . , 0 9 , 1 10 , 0 11 , . . . , 0 26 ), and so on. Now, the database owner sends these vectors to a cloud. Note that in this case, the cloud can easily deduce words.
The reason for using unary representation here is that it is very easy for verifying two identical letters. The expression S = r i=0 u i × v i , compares two letters, where (u 0 , u 1 , · · · u r ) and (v 0 , v 1 , · · · , v r ) are two unary representations. It is clear that whenever any two letters are identical, S is equal to one; otherwise, S is equal to zero. Binary representation (see §3.4), which reduces the space complexity as compared to the unary representation, can also be accepted, but the comparison function is different from that used in the unary representation [32] .
A secure way for creating secret-shares. When outsourcing a vector to the clouds, we use SSS and make secret-shares of every bit by selecting different polynomials of an identical degree; see Algorithm 2 in A. For example, we create secret-shares of the vector of 'A' ((1 1 , 0 2 , 0 3 , . . . , 0 26 )) by using 26 polynomials of an identical degree to create secret-shares of each bit, since the length of the vector is 26. Following that, we can create secret-shares for all the other letters and distribute them to different clouds.
Since we use SSS, a cloud cannot infer a secret. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that we use different polynomials for creating secret-shares of each letter; thereby multiple occurrences of a word in a database have different secret-shares. Therefore, a cloud is also unable to know the number of occurrences of a word in the whole database. Following that, the two occurrences of the word John in our example (see Figure 2 ) have two different secret-shares. Secret-shares of numeral values. We follow the similar approach for creating secret-shares of numeral values as used for alphabets. In particular, we create a unary vector of length 10 and put all the values 0 except only 1 according to the position of a number. For example, '1' becomes (1 1 , 0 2 , . . . , 0 10 ), '0' becomes (0 1 , 0 2 , . . . , 1 10 ), and so on. After that, use SSS to make secret-shares of every bit in each vector by selecting different polynomials of an identical degree for each number, and send them to multiple clouds. Note that by following the same procedure we can also create secret-shares of special letters or symbols.
Aside. It is challenging to create secret-shares of a database; but once we did it, the rest of operations are relatively easier. In addition, secret-sharing has the ultimate information-theoretical security and does not depend on (unproven) existence of one-way functions. Moreover, keys in the encryption grow to protect against the strongest computers the adversary may hold, yielding bigger and bigger computation overheads. It should also be noted that standard techniques based on Berlekamp-Welch algorithm [33] , where additional secret-shares are used to encode the data can be directly applied here, enabling us to cope with a malicious adversary, with no change in the communication pattern.
Query Model
Let q be a query on a relation, say R(
. . , A m ) be secret-shared relations of the relation R at c clouds, one relation at each cloud. The query q is transformed to c queries, say q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q c , that are transmitted to clouds such that the query q i is executed at the cloud i. The c clouds execute the query and provide the partial outputs. At the user-side, the final output is computed by a query, say q interpolate , that performs an interpolation on the partial results of c clouds. The user receives a correct answer to the query q if the execution of q interpolate returns outputs that are identical to the outputs when the query q is executed on the relation R, i.e.,
Adversarial Settings
We consider an honest-but-curious adversary (i.e., the untrusted public cloud), which is considered in the standard settings for security in the public cloud [34] , [35] , [36] . The honest-but-curious adversary stores the database, performs assigned computations correctly, and returns answers, but tries to breach the privacy of data or (MapReduce) computations, by analyzing data, computations, data flow, or output sizes. However, such an adversary does not modify or delete information/computation. 4 In our setting, the adversary cannot launch an attack against the DB owner, who is trustworthy. Hence, the adversary cannot access the secret-sharing algorithm at the DB owner. The adversary has the full access to public clouds, and hence, the stored data therein. However, the adversary is not aware of the location of c < c clouds, where c clouds data is required to break SSS. We assume that the adversary knows the following: (i) auxiliary information about the relations, e.g., number of attributes, number of tuples, organizations to which the relations belong; (ii) the transformed query executing on the relation; (iii) the size of outputs transferred from mappers to reducers and from the cloud to the users; and (iv) any background knowledge.
Having above-mentioned information, the adversarial goal is to learn the query, frequent selection criteria (or query keywords), the tuple satisfying the query, or the entire/partial database.
Security Goals and Analysis
The security goals under the above-mentioned system and adversarial settings are twofold:
(i) Data privacy requires that the stored input data, intermediate data during a computation, and output data are not revealed to the cloud, and the secret value can only be reconstructed by the DB owner or an authorized user. In addition, the two or more occurrences of a value in the relation must be different at the cloud to prevent frequency analysis while data is at the rest. We also need to prevent any statistical inference on the data after the query execution, so that the adversary cannot figure out how many numbers of tuples satisfy a query, as mentioned in §1.
(ii) Query privacy requires that the user query must be hidden from the cloud as well as the DB owner. In addition, the cloud cannot distinguish two or more queries of an identical type based on the output sizes. We mean that all the count queries are of the same type based on output sizes, since they return almost an identical number of bits as compared to selection or join queries. Following that the cloud cannot distinguish two or more selection or join queries based on the output size. In addition, we guarantee that all the filtering operations (e.g., selection) are pushed down before the join operation without revealing selection predicates. Thus, in short, to achieve the query privacy, we need to prevent access-patterns and output size attacks. Note that since we are using MapReduce, we need to prevent both the attacks at the map and reduce phases also.
We analyze our privacy-preserving algorithms on the following parameters: Communication cost: is the sum of all the bits that are required to transfer between a user and a cloud. Computational cost: is the sum of all the bits over which a cloud or a user works. Number of rounds: shows how many times a user communicates with a cloud for obtaining the results. Table 1 summarizes all the results of this paper and comparison with the existing algorithms, based on the five criteria, as: (i) communication cost, (ii) computational cost at the user and the cloud, (iii) number of rounds, (iv) matching of a keyword in an online or offline manner, and (v) dependence of secret-sharing. Note that in offline string matching operations, the user needs to download the whole database and then searches the query predicate. In this way, the number of rounds is decreased while the communication and computation cost increase. On the other hand, the meaning of online operations is that the cloud performs the desired operation without sending the whole database to the user.
PRIVACY-PRESERVING QUERY PROCESSING ON SECRET-SHARES USING MAPREDUCE IN THE CLOUDS
This section will present four privacy-preserving algorithms for performing four fundamental operations on relations of the form of secret-shares, as: count the occurrences of a predicate, selection, join, and range queries. These algorithms work on string matching that is carried out using AA [15] . Recall that AA was designed to execute only count operations. All these algorithms obliviously execute operations at the cloud, leading to obscure the query as well as the tuples satisfying the query, while the user performs a simple operation to reconstruct the result.
Count Query
We present a privacy-preserving counting algorithm that finds occurrences of a query keyword/pattern, say p, in an attribute, say A i , of a relation, say R. In our setting, at the user-side, the count query is transformed into c secret-shared count queries containing the predicate p of the form of secret-shares, and the secret-shared count queries are sent to c clouds. A cloud, say k ∈ [1, c], performs a string matching algorithm (explained below) using AA that compares each value of the attribute A i of the relation R s k with the query predicate p. If a value of the attribute A i and the predicate p match, it will result in 1 of the form of secret-shares; otherwise, the result will be 0 of the form of secret-shares. While executing the string matching operation on the next value, the output of the previous matching operation is added, leading to provide the final output after executing the matching operation on each value of the attribute A i . Since the sum of the values (1 or 0) stays of the form of secret-shares, the cloud cannot learn the exact answer. The user performs an interpolation operation on the outputs obtained from c clouds.
We use our running example to illustrate a count query that finds the number of people having the first name as John in the Employee relation; see Figure 2 . The algorithm is divided into two phases, as: PHASE 1: Privacy-preserving counting in the clouds, §3.1.1. PHASE 2: Result reconstruction at the user-side, §3.1.2.
Counting a predicate
For the purpose of simplicity and understanding, we first show how to execute a count query on the encoded database (non-secret-shares), which is mentioned in §2.1. Then, we show how to count the occurrences of a predicate/keyword in a relation of the form of secret-shares.
Counting a predicate over an encoded relation (non-secret-shares).
Working at the user-side. A user creates unary vectors for each letter of the counting predicate p (as described in §2.1) and sends them to the cloud. Working in the cloud. Now, a cloud holds: (i) a relation of the form of encoded data, (ii) the counting predicate p of the form of encoded data, and (iii) a code of mappers. The mapper creates an automaton, which performs a string matching operation, with x + 1 nodes, where x is the length of p, and initializes node values. The first node is assigned a value one (N 1 = 1, N i shows the value of the node i), and all the other nodes are assigned values zero (N i = 0, i = 1). The mapper reads each encoded word of the specified attribute and executes x + 1 steps, given in Table 3 , for finding new values of the nodes. The steps given in Table 3 are described below with the help of an example. At the end of the computation, the value of the node N x+1 shows the number of occurrences of p in a relation. Example. In our running example, the user is counting occurrences of John, and hence, creates and sends four unary vectors, corresponding to 'J,' 'o,' 'h,' and 'n' to the STEP 1:
shows that the node j is executing a step in the i th iteration. The final value of the node N x+1 , which is sent to the user, is the number of occurrences of the predicate. cloud. The cloud holds the Employee relation of the form of encoded data, encoded John, and the mapper's code. The mapper creates an automaton of five nodes and assigns a value one to the first node and zero to the other nodes. The mapper executes five steps given in Table 3 for each value of the FirstName attribute of the Employee relation.
In the first iteration i = 1, the mapper reads the word 'Adam,' executes STEPs 1 and 2, and obtains the value of v 1 by multiplying the vector of 'A' by the vector of 'J,' which results in v 1 = 0 and N (1) 2 = 0. After that, the mapper executes STEP 3 and obtains the value of v 2 by multiplying the vector of 'd' by the vector of 'o,' which results in v 2 = 0, and hence, using the value of N will be 1, which shows that until now only one employee has John as a first name. The mapper reads the word 'John,' executes all the STEPs and eventually results in N (4) 5 = 2, which shows that two employees have John as their first names.
Counting a predicate over secret-shared relations at different clouds. Now, we explain how to count the occurrences of the counting predicate p in a relation of the form of secret-shares. Algorithm 3 in A presents pseudocode of counting algorithm. Working at the user-side. Recall that the user creates unary vectors for each letter of p. In order to hide the vectors of p, the user creates secret-shares of each vector of p, as suggested in §2.1, sends them to the c clouds. In our running example, the user first creates four unary vectors for each letter of John, and then, creates secret-shares of each unary vector. In addition, the user writes a code of mappers that contains the pattern length, secret-shared values of the automation nodes. Working in the cloud. Now, a cloud holds the following: (i) a relation of the form secret-shares, (ii) the counting predicate p of the form of secret-shares, and (iii) the code of mappers with node values of the form of secret-shares. In order to count the number of occurrences of p, the mapper performs steps mentioned in Table 3 . Note that at this time, the mapper is unable to know the value of the node N x+1 in each iteration, since the value is of the form of secret-shares. The mapper sends the final value of the node N x+1 to the user (of the form of a key, value pair, where the key is an identity of an input split over which the operation was performed, and the corresponding value is the final value of the node N x+1 of the form of secret-shares). Aside. If a user searches John in a database containing names like 'John' and 'Johnson,' then our algorithm will show two occurrences of John. However, it is a problem associated with string matching. In order to search a predicate precisely, we may use the terminating symbol for indicating the end of the predicate. In the above example, we can use "John ", which is the searching predicate ending with a whitespace, for obtaining the correct answer.
Leakage discussion. Since each query predicate is of the form of secret-shares and the string matching operation is executed over all the values of an attribute, access-patterns are hidden, and hence, the adversary cannot distinguish any query predicate in the count queries. The output of any count query, which is of the form of secret-shares, is almost identical in terms of the number of bits in our setting; hence, the adversary cannot know the exact count and differentiate two count queries based on the output sizes. This also prevents frequency-count attacks on the values during the query execution. In the case of a large relation, many mappers can be executed on different partitions of the relation; however, outputs from many mappers cannot distinguish any two count queries.
Theorem 1
The communication cost, the computational cost at a cloud, and the computational cost at the user-side for counting the occurrences of a predicate is at most O(1), at most nw, and at most O(1), respectively, where n is the number of tuples in a relation and w is the maximum bit length.
Proof. Since a user sends a predicate of bit length w and receives c values from the clouds, the communication cost is almost constant that is O(1). The cloud works on a specific attribute containing n values, each of bit length at most w; hence, the computational cost at a cloud is at most nw. The user only performs the interpolation on the c values; hence, the computational cost at the user-side is also constant, O(1).
Selection Queries
This section presents privacy-preserving algorithms for selection queries. The proposed algorithms first execute Algorithm 3 for counting the number of tuples containing a selection predicate, say p, and then, after obtaining addresses of tuples containing p, fetch such tuples. Specifically, we provide 2-phased algorithms, where: PHASE 0: Count the occurrence of p. PHASE 1: Finding addresses of tuples containing p. PHASE 2: Fetching all the tuples containing p.
We classify the selection query based on the number of tuples with a value, as follows:
One value holds only one tuple. For example, the Salary attribute contains four values, and each value has one tuple; see Figure 2 . In this case, there is no need to know the address of the tuple containing p, PHASE 1. §3.2.1 presents an algorithm for retrieving tuples in the case of one value with one tuple. Multiple values hold multiple tuples. For example, the FirstName attribute contains four values, and two employees have the first name as John; see Figure 2 . In this case, we need to know the address of the tuple containing p (PHASE 1) before retrieving the desired tuples. §3.2.2 presents two algorithms for retrieving tuples when a value can hold multiple tuples.
One Value One Tuple
In the case of one tuple per value, Algorithm 4 (pseudocode is given in A) fetches the entire tuple in a privacy-preserving manner without revealing the selection predicate p and the tuple satisfying p. Here, we explain how to fetch a single tuple containing the selection predicate p.
Consider a query: SELECT * FROM R WHERE A 1 = p. In order to fetch a tuple containing the selection predicate p at the attribute A 1 of the relation R, the user creates secret-shares of p and sends them to c clouds with the attribute name A 1 . On the values of the attribute A 1 , the cloud executes a map function that matches the predicate p with i th (i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where n is the number of tuples in the relation R) value using AA. Consequently, the map function results in either 0 or 1 of the form of secret-shares. If p matches the i th value of the attribute A 1 , then the result is 1. After that, the map function multiplies the result (0 or 1) by all the other attribute values at the i th tuple. In this manner, the map function creates a relation of n tuples and m attributes, where all the tuples contain 0 across all the attributes except the tuple that is containing p at the attribute A 1 . When the map function finishes over all the n tuples, it adds and sends all the secret-shares of each attribute, as: S 1 ||S 2 || . . . ||S m to the user, where S j is the sum of the secret-shares of the j th attribute. The user, on receiving shares from c clouds, performs an interpolation that provides the desired tuple containing p. Leakage discussion. The cloud performs identical operations (i.e., string matching on secret-shared values and multiplication of the result) on each tuple of the relation, and finally adds all the secret-shares of each attribute. Hence, access-patterns are hidden, leading to obscure the tuple containing the predicate as well as hide the selection predicate from the adversary. Moreover, the user does not receive more information about the relation during the query execution. The user receives only the desired tuple if the relation contains such a tuple.
Steps in Fetching a Single Tuple containing a

Theorem 2
The communication cost, the computational cost at a cloud, and the computational cost at the user-side for fetching a single tuple containing a predicate is at most O(mw), at most O(nmw), and at most O(mw), respectively, where a relation has n tuples and m attributes and w is the maximum bit length.
Proof. The user sends a selection predicate of bit length w and receives c secret-shares and, eventually, a tuple containing m attributes of size at most mw. Thus, the communication cost is at most O(mw) bits. The cloud counts the occurrences of the predicate in a specific attribute containing n values, and then again, performs a similar operation on the n tuples, multiplying the resultant by each m values of bit length at most w. Hence, the computational cost at the cloud is at most O(nmw). The user performs the interpolation on c values to know the occurrences of the predicate, and then, again performs the interpolation on c tuples containing m attributes. Thus, the computational cost at the user-side is at most O(mw).
Multiple Values with Multiple Tuples
When multiple tuples contain a selection predicate, say p, the user cannot fetch all those tuples obliviously without knowing their addresses. Therefore, we first need to design an algorithm to obliviously obtain the addresses of all the tuples containing the predicate p, and then, obliviously fetch the tuples. Throughout this section, we consider that tuples contain p. This section provides two search algorithms that have 2-phases, as: PHASE 0: Count the occurrence of p. PHASE 1: Finding the addresses of the desired tuples. PHASE 2: Fetching all the tuples.
Both the algorithms differ only at PHASE 1 to know the addresses of the desired tuples, as follows: The first algorithm, called one-round algorithm, is naive and requires only one-round of communication between a user and clouds while the second algorithm, called tree-based algorithm, requires multiple rounds of communication, but has lower communication cost. Before going into details of algorithms, we first explore a tradeoff.
Tradeoff. When fetching multiple tuples containing p, there is a tradeoff between the number of communication rounds and the computational cost at the user-side, and this tradeoff will be clear after the description of the first and the second algorithms. In particular, the user performs a significant amount of interpolation task (on n × c values) to know the addresses of all the tuples containing p in one round. On the other hand, obtaining the addresses of tuples containing p in multiple rounds requires performing a count operation many times by the cloud, while the user performs a simple interpolation (on less than n × c values).
One-round algorithm. A simple and naive algorithm requires only two rounds of communication between a user and the cloud for executing the two-phases, one round for each phase, as follows:
Finding addresses. The user sends p of the form of secret-shares, the length of p, and the attribute m over which the selection predicate to be searched to the clouds. The cloud executes a map function that performs the string matching algorithm on each secret-share value of the m attribute, (as we did to count the occurrences of p in §3.1.1). However, now, the mapper does not accumulate occurrences, and hence, sends n values corresponding to each tuple. The user interpolates each value, resulting in a vector, say v, of length n, where the i th entity has a value either 0 or 1 depending on the occurrence of p in the i th tuple of the m attribute of the relation. As an advantage, the user knows addresses of all the desired tuples in a single round, but she works on n × c secret-shared values.
Fetching tuples. The user creates a × n matrix, say M , and creates secret-shares of it, by following the approach suggested in §2.1, where is the number of occurrences of p. All the n columns of a row of the matrix M has 0 but 1 that is dependent on the addresses of the tuples containing p. For example, in the vector v, if the second position is 1, then a row of the matrix M contains all n column values to be 0 except the second column that has 1. After that, n polynomials of an identical degree create secret-shares of all the values, and such a matrix is sent to the clouds.
Recall that the cloud has a relation of n tuples and m attributes. A MapReduce job at the cloud multiplies the matrix M by the relation and sends the results to the user. Recall that the matrix M has 0 and 1 of the form of secret-shares, so that the multiplication results in only the desired tuple and all the other tuples are eliminated. The user finally interpolates the received tuples, resulting in desired tuples containing p. A similar approach is also presented in [18] . Leakage discussion. The cloud performs identical operations, i.e., string matching on secret-shared values in the first round and multiplication of the relation by a matrix containing the address of desired tuples in the second round, over all the tuples of the relation. Hence, access-patterns are hidden, leading to obscure the selection predicate and the tuple containing the predicate from the adversary. The communication cost is also minimal in this approach.
The number of rows in the output (or the output size), however, can reveal the number of occurrence of the secret-shared selection predicate, which was hidden before the query execution. If the adversary is aware of selection predicates based on background knowledge, she can estimate the number of tuples with each value in an attribute. However, knowing a secret-shared selection predicate is not a trivial task. Nonetheless, a trivial way to overcome such an attack is to download the entire database and perform the query at the private cloud. However, such a solution incurs communication and computation overheads. To the best of our knowledge, there is no solution to prevent output size attacks except sending fake data to the user. Such a solution works for users who are willing to pay a little bit higher communication cost while preserving a desired level of privacy. For example, CryptDB [22] that allows different operations on the database while revealing some information due to deterministic and order-preserving encryption, and Opaque [37] that send fake data to prevent output size attacks in using SGX.
We can also adopt the same solution to send more information than the desired information to hide occurrences of the selection predicate. The user can send a matrix with rows and n columns, where ≤ ≤ n, and the first rows contain 1 at the appropriate position. In this case, the user interpolates the first rows of the received matrix after the second round. Theorem 3 After obtaining the addresses of the desired tuples containing a predicate, p, the communication cost, the computational cost at a cloud, and the computational cost at the user-side for fetching the desired tuples is at most O((n+m) w), O( nmw), and at most O((n + m )w), respectively, where a relation has n tuples and m attributes, w is the maximum bit length, and is the number of tuples containing p.
Proof. In the first round of the one-round algorithm, the user receives n secret-shares, each of bit-length at most w, of a particular attribute. In the second round, the user sends a × n matrix and receives tuples, each of size at most mw. Thus, the maximum number of bits flow is O((n+m) w). Mappers perform string matching operations on n secret-shares of a particular attribute in the first round and then matrix multiplication on all the n tuples and m attributes in the second round. Hence, the computational cost at the cloud is at most O( nmw). The computational cost at the user-side is at most O((n + m )w), since the user works on the n secret-shares of a specific attribute, creates a × n matrix in the first round, and then works on tuples containing m values, each of size at most w bits.
Tree-based algorithm. In order to decrease the computational load at the user-side, unlike one-round algorithm, for knowing the desired tuple addresses, we propose a tree-based search (Algorithm 5 in A) that finds the addresses of the desired tuples in multiple rounds, and then, fetches them.
Taking inspiration form Algorithm 4 for one tuple per value (given in §3.2.1), we can also obtain the addresses in a privacy-preserving manner while a single tuple contains the selection predicate p. Thus, for finding addresses of tuples containing p, the user requests the cloud to partition the whole relation into certain blocks (≥ , depending on the privacy requirements) such that each block belongs to one of the following cases: 1) A block contains no occurrence of p, and hence, no fetch operation is needed. 2) A block contains one/multiple tuples but only a single tuple contains p. 3) A block contains h tuples, and all the h tuples contain p. 4) A block contains multiple tuples but fewer tuples contain p. Finding addresses. We follow an idea of partitioning the database and counting the occurrences of p in the blocks, until each block satisfies one of the above-mentioned cases. Specifically, the user initiates a sequence of Query & Answer (Q&A) rounds. In the first Q&A round, the user counts occurrences of p in the whole database (or in an assigned input split to a mapper) and then partitions the database into at least blocks, since we assumed that tuples contain p. In the second round, the user again counts occurrences of p in each block and focuses on the blocks satisfying Case 4. There is no need to consider the blocks satisfying Case 2 or 3, since the user can apply Algorithm 4 (one tuple per value) in both the cases. However, if the multiple tuples of a block in the second round contain p, i.e., Case 4, the user again partitions such a block until it satisfies either Case 1, 2 or 3. After that, the user can obtain the addresses of the related tuples using the method similar to Algorithm 4.
Fetching tuples. The user applies the approach described in the one-round algorithm for fetching multiple tuples after obtaining the addresses of the tuples.
Leakage discussion. The cloud performs identical operations, i.e., counting the tuples satisfying the selection predicate in phase 0, partition the relation into certain blocks in phase 1, and transmission of tuples in phase 2 (using the algorithm for one tuple per value §3.2.1), over all the tuples of the relation. Hence, access-patterns are hidden, leading to obscure the selection predicate and the tuple containing the predicate from the adversary.
In the tree-based search algorithm, the user can only partition the blocks satisfying Case 4. Consequently, the adversary can deduce that such blocks contain the desired tuples without knowing the actual tuples. If we partition all the blocks until each block contains either one or two tuples, the adversary cannot deduce which block is containing desired tuples, at the cost of increased communication and computational costs. Further, the user can fetch the desired tuples during the execution of Q&A rounds, when a block satisfies Case 2 or Case 3. However, the adversary can deduce that some tuples have been fetched from some blocks based on the output sizes. In order to completely hide such information, we emphasize that the user should wait until the completion of all the Q&A rounds. Further, the user can partition block, where ≤ ≤ n to hide the number of tuples satisfying the selection predicate. Example. Figure 3 provides an example to illustrate the tree-based approach. Let an input split consists of 9 tuples, and the number of occurrence of p is two. When the user knows the number of occurrences, she starts Q&A rounds. In each Q&A round, a mapper partitions specific parts of the input split into two blocks, performs AA in each block, and sends results, which are occurrences of p in each block, of the form of secret-shares back to the user. In this example, the user initiates the first Q&A round, and a mapper divides the input split into two blocks. In each block, it counts the occurrences of p and sends the results to the user. The user interpolates the results and knows that the first and second blocks contain two and zero tuples having p, respectively. In the second Q&A round, the user requests to the cloud to partition the first block into two blocks. The mapper performs an identical operation as it does in the first round, and after three Q&A rounds, the user knows the addresses of all the tuples containing p.
Theorem 4
The maximum number of rounds for obtaining addresses of tuples containing a selection predicate, p, using tree-based search Algorithm 5 is log n + log 2 + 1, and the communication cost for obtaining such addresses is at most O (log n + log 2 ) . The computational cost at a cloud and the computational cost at the user-side is at most O (log n + log 2 ) nw and at most O (log n+log 2 ) , respectively, where a relation has n tuples and m attributes, is the number of tuples containing p, and w is the maximum bit length.
Proof. According to the description of tree-based search Algorithm 5, in the current Q&A round, the cloud partitions the blocks specified in the last round into blocks equally. Thus, in i th round of Q&A, the number of the tuples contained in each sub-block is at most n i . After log n rounds of Q&A, the number of the tuples contained in every block is fewer than . At this time, note that there may be some blocks still holding more than one tuple containing p. Thus, we need at most log 2 rounds for determining the addresses of those tuples. When the cloud finishes partitioning all the blocks that contain more than two tuples containing p, the cloud needs at most one more round to obliviously transmit the addresses of related tuples. Thus, the total number of Q&A round is at most log n + log 2 + 1.
Notice that for each round, there are at most 2 blocks containing more than two tuples containing p that indicates that at most 2 blocks need further partitioning. Thus, in every Q&A round (except the first round requires answers), each cloud only needs to perform a count operation for 2 sub-blocks and sends the results back to the user. When the cloud finishes partitioning, it has to perform Address fetch() operation to determine the addresses. It requires at most words transition between the user and each cloud. Therefore, the communication cost is at most O (log n + log 2 ) · .
A cloud performs a count operation in each round; hence, the computational cost at the cloud is at most O (log n + log 2 ) nw . In each round, the user interpolates the results for obtaining the occurrences of the predicate in each block; hence, the computational cost at the user-side is at most O (log n + log 2 ) . Example. In figure 3 , in order to fetch tuples containing p, the user needs 3 rounds, which are less than log 2 9 + log 2 2 + 1 = 5.
Join Queries
Consider two relations X(A, B) and Y (B, C), where B is the joining attribute. A trivial and user-side computational-heavy solution for an oblivious join is as follows: (i) fetch all the secret-shares of a joining attribute from c clouds and perform an interpolation, (ii) find tuples of both the relations that have an identical joining value and fetch all those tuples, (iii) perform the interpolation on the tuples, and (iv) perform a MapReduce job for joining the tuples at the user-side. The following sections present oblivious join algorithms for decreasing the workload at the user-side and performing the join (especially oblivious primary to foreign key (PK/FK) join and oblivious equijoin) at the cloud.
Primary-Foreign Keys based Oblivious Join
Consider two relations: a parent relation X (A, B) having the attribute B as a primary key and n x tuples, and a child relation Y (B, C) of n y tuples. We use string matching operations (a variant of one tuple per value; Algorithm 4) on secret-shares for performing PK/FK join on X(A, B) and Y (B, C) relations based on the B attribute.
The following steps are executed: 1. In a cloud: a. A mapper reads i th tuple * , b i of the X relation and provides n y pairs of key, value , where the key is an identity from 1 to n y and the value is the i th secret-shared tuple * , b i . A * denotes any value. A reducer corresponding to key 1 matches b 1 of X with b 1 of Y that results in 1, b 2 of X with b 1 of Y that results in 0, and b 3 of X with b 1 of Y that results in 0. Remember 0 and 1 are of the form of secret-shares. Now, the reducer multiplies the three values (1,0,0) of the form of secret-shares by the tuples a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , and a 3 , b 3 , respectively. After that, the reducer adds all the A-values and the B-values. Note that we will obtain now only the desired tuple, i.e., a 1 , b 1 . The reducer appends the C value of the tuple b 1 , c 1 to the tuple a 1 , b 1 . The same operation is carried out by other reducers. When the user performs the interpolation on the outputs from c clouds, only the desired output tuples of join are obtained. Aside. We assume that the all the A, B, and C values of the relations do not contain zero.
Leakage discussion. Each mapper performs identical operations, i.e., generating key-value pairs of each tuple. Each reducer also performs identical operations, i.e., string matching on secret-shared values of the joining attribute and multiplication of the resultant by each tuple, and finally adds all the secret-shares of each attribute. In addition, the data flow between mappers and reducer is identical. Therefore, access-patterns are hidden from the adversary that cannot know which tuples of the parent relation join with which tuples of the child table. The adversary can only know the joining attribute.
In some cases where the selection operation is pushed before the join operation to faster the query processing may reveal some information based on output sizes. In order to prevent such a leakage, the user can execute the join algorithm on some fake tuples, whether the tuples satisfy the selection predicate or not, as mentioned in §3.2.2.
Theorem 5
The communication cost, the computational cost at a cloud, and the computational cost at the user-side for performing PK/FK join of two relations X and Y is at most O(nmw), at most O(n 2 mw), and at most O(nmw), respectively, where each relation has n tuples and m attributes, w is the maximum bit length, there is no selection query before the join, and each tuple of the parent relation join with one tuple of the child table.
Proof. Since the user receives the whole relation of n tuples and at most 2m − 1 attributes, the communication cost is at most O(nmw), and due to the interpolation on the n tuples, the computational cost at the user-side is at most O(nmw). A reducer compares each value of the joining attribute of the relation Y with all n values of the joining attribute of the relation X, and it results in at most n 2 comparisons. Further, the output of the comparison is multiplied by m − 1 attributes of the corresponding tuple of the relation Y . Hence, the computational cost at a cloud is at most O(n 2 mw).
Non-PK/FK-based oblivious equijoin
This section presents an oblivious equijoin algorithm. Consider two relations X(A, B) and Y (B, C) having n tuples in each and B as a joining attribute that can hold multiple occurrences of a value in both the relations.
Note that PK/FK-based join approach, §3.3.1, will not work here. The reason is as follows: when the B value of a tuple, say a 1 , b 1 , of the relation X is compared with all tuples of Y that contains multiple tuples with the value b 1 , say b 1 , c 1 , b 1 , c 2 . . ., it results in multiple ones that will produce all the desired tuples of the relation Y containing b 1 . Here, the sum of all the values of an attribute cannot distinguish two or multiple occurrences of the b 1 value, and hence, the result will be a garbage value.
In the proposed oblivious equijoin approach, the user may perform a bit more computation, unlike PK/FK join. In particular, the user finds common B values of both the relations after interpolating c × n shares of B attributes of both relations, then executes an equijoin with the help of the clouds. In order to perform an oblivious equijoin, we need c more non-communicating clouds. Here, we call a set of the first c clouds as the first layer, and a set of the remaining c clouds as the second layer. Note that the clouds within a layer are non-communicating; however, the i th cloud of the first layer can communicate with only the i th clouds of the second layer. We assume that the first layer holds the relations, and the second layer provides outputs to an equijoin; see Figure 5 .
The Approach. The approach consists of the following three steps, where the second step that performs an equijoin is executed at the clouds: 1. The user fetches all the secret-shared B-values of the relations X and Y and performs an interpolation. Consequently, the user knows which B-values are identical in both relations and which tuples contain identical values. 5 2. For each B-value (say, b i ) that is in both the relations:
a. The user executes the one-round algorithm (given in §3.2.2) for the value b i on the first layer clouds that obliviously send all the tuples containing b i in the relation X and Y to the second layer clouds. 3. The user fetches the output tuples from the second layer of the clouds and performs the interpolation. Leakage discussion. In the oblivious equijoin approach, the cloud can hold the following knowledge by observing data transmission: (i) the number of joining tuples, (ii) the number of joining values, and (iii) the joining attribute. Our approach cannot prevent the adversary to know the joining attribute. However, the number of joining tuples, values, and tuples per value can be prevented by executing the algorithm for some extra tuples, which actually do not 5 . The use of a trusted proxy can eliminate this step, and the proxy can also help in oblivious join by pre-computed identical joining values. Systems such as CryptDB [22] , Arx [38] , and PPGJ [39] use a trusted proxy for easing the operation complexity. 
User-side
Data owner
The first layer of the clouds The second layer of the clouds Fig. 5 : The two layers of the cloud for an oblivious equijoin. The first layer executes selection queries using the one-round algorithm and the second layer executes an equijoin.
produce any output while preventing the leakage. 6
Theorem 6
The number of rounds, the communication cost, the computational cost at a cloud, and the computational cost at the user-side for performing equijoin of two relations X and Y is at most O(2k), at most O(2nwk + 2k 2 mw), at most O( 2 kmw), and at most O(2nw+2k 2 mw), respectively, where a relation has n tuples and m attributes, k is the number of identical values of the joining attribute in the relations, is the maximum number of occurrences of a joining value, and w is the maximum bit length.
Proof. Since there are at most k identical values of the joining attribute in both the relations and all the k values can have a different number of occurrences in the relations, the user has to send at most 2k matrices (following an approach of the one-round algorithm for fetching multiple tuples §3.2.1) in O(2k) rounds. The user sends at most 2k matrices, each of n rows and of size at most w; hence, the user sends at most O(2knw) bits. Since at most tuples have an identical value of the joining attribute in one relation, equijoin provides at most 2 tuples. The user receives at most 2 tuples for each k value having at most 2m − 1 attributes; hence, the user receives at most O(2k 2 mw) bits. Therefore, the communication cost is at most O(2nwk + 2k 2 mw) bits.
The cloud of the first layer executes the one-round algorithm for fetching multiple tuples for all k values of both relations having 2n tuples; hence the clouds of the first layer performs at most O(2nkw) computation. In the second layer, a cloud performs an equijoin (or concatenation) of at most tuples for each k value; thus, the computational cost at the cloud is at most O( 2 kmw).
The user first interpolates at most 2n values of bit length w of the joining attribute, and then, interpolates k 2 tuples containing at most 2m − 1 attributes of bit length w. Therefore, the computational cost at the user-side is at most O(2nw + 2k 2 mw). 6 . In our join algorithms, the adversary can deduce the type of join that may be either PK/FK join or equijoin; however, such a knowledge can also be prevented by applying oblivious equijoin algorithm for PK/FK join.
Range Query
A range query finds, for example, all the employees whose salaries are between $1000 and $2000. We propose an approach for performing privacy-preserving range queries based on 2's complement subtraction. A number, say x, belongs in a range, say [a, b], if sign(x − a) = 0 and sign(x − b) = 0, where sign(x − a) and sign(b − x) denote the sign bits of x − a and x − b, respectively, after 2's complement-based subtraction.
Recall that in §2.1, we proposed an approach for creating secret-shares of a number, say x, using a unary representation that provides a vector, where all the values are 0 except only 1 according to the position of the number. The approach works well to count the occurrences of x and fetch all the tuples having x. However, on this vector, we cannot perform a subtraction operation. Hence, in order to execute range queries, we present a number using a binary-representation, which results in a vector of length, say l. After that, we use SSS to make secret-shares of every bit in the vector by selecting l different polynomials of an identical degree for each bit position. The approach. The idea of finding whether a number, x, belongs to the range, [a, b], is based on 2's complement subtraction. In [32] , the authors provided an algorithm for subtracting secret-shares using 2's complement. However, we will provide a simple 2's complement-based subtraction algorithm for secret-shares. A mapper checks the sign bits after subtraction for deciding the number whether it is in the range or not, as follows:
After checking each number, we can use one of the following approaches: 1) A simple solution. The mapper sends the sign bit's values of the form of secret-shares to the user for each tuple. The user interpolates all the received n values from c clouds and creates an array of length n. If the number x in the i th tuples belongs in the range [a, b], then the i th position in the array is one. Otherwise, the i th position in the array is zero. Finally, the user fetches all the tuples having value 1 in the array using the one-round algorithm for fetching multiple tuples; see §3.2.2.
2) The mapper counts the occurrence of the value belonging to the range and sends the count to the user that interpolates them. After knowing how many values are in the range, the user can implement Algorithm 4 (one value one tuple §3.2.1) or Algorithm 5 (tree-based search algorithm §3.2.2), depending on the number of tuples satisfying the range. However, in this manner, we have to check the numbers whether they are in the range or not at the time of fetching the tuple. In this approach, we use many rounds for fetching the desired tuples; however, the user does not interpolate the n × c values as in the previous solution. The pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 6 in A.
2's complement-based secret-shares subtraction.
Algorithm 1 provides a way to perform 2's complement-based subtraction on secret-shares. We follow Algorithm 1: SS -SUB (A, B): 2's complement-based subtraction of secret-sharing Inputs:
where a i , b i are secret-shares of bits of 2's complement represented number, t: the length of A and B in the binary form Outputs: rb t−1 : the sign bit of B − A Variable: carry[]: to store the carry for each bit addition rb: to store the result for each bit addition We start at the least significant bit (LSB), invert a 0 , calculateā 0 + b 0 + 1 and its carry bit; see lines 1-3. Then, we go through the rest of the bits, calculate the carry and the result for each bit; see line 4. After finishing all the computations, the most significant bit (MSB) or the sign bit is returned; see line 5. Algorithm 1 is similar to the algorithm presented in [32] , but simpler, as we only need the sign bit of the result. After obtaining secret-shares of sign bits of x − a and b − x, we perform an extra calculation:
1 − sign(x − a) + sign(b − x) .
(2)
According to Equation 1 , if x ∈ [a, b], the result of Equation 2 is secret-share of 1; otherwise, the result is secret-share of 0. Based on Equation 2, we can obtain the number of occurrences, which are in the required range in the database. Degree reduction. Note that in range query, we utilize 2's complement subtraction and each secret-shared bit of the operands. However, during the subtraction procedure, the degree of the polynomial (for secret-sharing) increases. For example, one can check that degree of MSB doubles when one subtraction completed. In [32] , the authors add two more players for degree reduction, if we do not have enough clouds to recover the secrets, we can follow the same line as the degree reduction algorithm presented in [32] . For simplicity, we do not give the detail of the algorithms for degree reduction, interested readers may refer to [32] , [40] .
Leakage discussion. Existing encryption-based [41] or order-preserving secret-shared [17] approaches for a range search reveal the order of the values. Since we are outsourcing each value of the form of secret-shares created by using different polynomials, our approach does not reveal any order of the value, unlike [17] , [41] . The adversary cannot learn exact range values by observing string-matching operations, which hide access-patterns. However, based on background knowledge and the output size, the adversary may estimate the query range. For example, consider an employee relation and two queries: (i) find details of employees having age between 18-21, and (ii) find details of employees having age between 22-75. The output sizes of the two queries are significantly different. Hence, the adversary can trivially distinguish such two range queries. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no technique to prevent such an attack without padding the answers. Output size prevention using padding of fake tuples can also be adopted in our approach, depending on the privacy requirements.
Theorem 7
The communication and the computational costs of the range count query have the same order of magnitude as counting Algorithm 3, and the communication and computational cost of fetching multi-tuples satisfying a range have the same order of magnitude as selection queries Algorithm 4 or 5.
Note that the function MAP range count(); see line 8 of Algorithm 6, works on each value of a specific attribute as we did in count queries, §3.1. Once we know all the occurrences of tuples satisfying a range, we find their address using Algorithm 4 or 5. Thus, the communication and the computational costs have an identical order of magnitude as Algorithm 4 or 5.
CONCLUSION
Data is growing day-by-day, and it is very challenging to process the data in-home due to limited resources while achieving the complete security and privacy. Thus, in order to deal with resource constraints and avoid overheads for maintaining and executing queries at the database owner side, a database is outsourced to untrusted edge or public clouds that can reveal the database or computations. The modern data processing frameworks such as Hadoop or Spark, which are designed for a trusted environment, do not deal with security and privacy of data and computations. This paper presented information-theoretically secure data and computation outsourcing techniques, especially, algorithms for count, selection, projection, join, and range queries while using MapReduce as an underlying programming model. The techniques are designed in such a way that a heavy computation is executed at the cloud instead of the user, without revealing the query to the cloud or the database owner. Thus, in answering any query, the database owner does not need to be online. There is a prominent open question such as how to extend the proposed technique for several MapReduce-based operations, e.g., graph processing and different types of very complex operations such as nested queries on databases. When the occurrences > 1, the user needs to know the addresses of all the tuples contain p. Thus, the user requests to partition the input split/relation to blocks, and hence, sends and p of the form of secret-shares to the clouds; see line 3.
The mappers partition the whole relation or input split into blocks, perform privacy-preserving count operations in each block, and send all the results back to the user; see lines 4 -6. The user interpolates the results and knows the number of occurrences of p in each block; see line 8. Based on the number of occurrences of p in each block, the user decides which block needs further partitioning, and there are four cases, as follows: 1) The block contains no occurrence of p: it is not necessary to handle this block. 2) The block contains only one tuple containing p: it is easy to determine its address using function Address fetch() that is based on AA; see lines 10 and 14.
3) The block contains h tuples and each h tuple contains p: directly know the addresses, i.e., all the h tuples are required to fetch; see line 11. 4) The block contains h tuples and more than one, but less than h tuples contain p: we cannot know the addresses of these tuples. Hence, the user recursively requests to partition that block and continues the process until the sub-blocks satisfy the above-mentioned Case 2 or Case 3; see lines 9 and 13. When the user obtains the addresses of all the tuples containing p, she fetches all the tuples using a method described for the naive algorithm; see line 12.
